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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Robert M. Wallett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment 
alleging that his former employer, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (“the 
Commission”), and two of its former executives (collectively, “Defendants”) demoted 
and later fired him because he refused to participate in their pay-to-play and influence 
peddling schemes.  The District Court first dismissed Wallett‟s supplemental state law 
claims and then granted Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on the First 
Amendment political patronage discrimination claim.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
I.  Background 
 In 1997, the Commission hired Wallett as Director of Maintenance.  He was hired 
during a Republican administration.  Throughout his tenure at the Commission, Wallett 
served as an at-will employee. 
 In 2003, newly-elected Democratic Governor Edward Rendell appointed Joseph 
G. Brimmeier to be the new Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the Commission.  In 
May 2003, Brimmeier transferred Wallett from his position as Director of Maintenance to 
Director of Facilities.  As a result of the transfer, Wallett was demoted from a Grade 19 
position to a Grade 18 position. 
 The Facilities Department was part of the Commission‟s Engineering Department.  
As Director of Facilities, Wallett led the Department‟s consultant selection process which 
was used when there was a need for mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and environmental 
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services that could not be performed by Commission staff.  After a need for outside 
services was identified, Wallett‟s staff prepared summaries and recommendations on 
each contractor who had submitted a letter of interest. 
Each contract was then placed on the schedule for discussion at the next meeting 
of the Technical Review Committee (“TRC”), a committee of Commission employees 
who provided rankings and recommendations to the Commissioners for all outside 
engineering contracts.  At all relevant times, the TRC consisted of CEO Brimmeier, Chief 
Operating Officer (“COO”) George Hatalowich, the Chief Engineer, an Assistant Chief 
Engineer, the Manager of Contracts Administration, and an individual appointed by the 
CEO. 
 When a Facilities Department-related engineering contract was on the TRC 
agenda, Wallett would attend the meeting and make a short presentation summarizing the 
applicants and recommending certain firms for the contract.  Wallett attended, on 
average, four to six TRC meetings each year during his tenure as Director of Facilities.  
The TRC members ranked each applicant and then recommended an applicant to the 
Commissioners who were ultimately responsible for awarding the contracts. 
  In May 2009, Brimmeier decided to eliminate the position of Director of Facilities 
and terminated Wallett‟s employment with the Commission.  Approximately three 
months after his termination, Wallett submitted an application for the newly-created 
position of Manager of Facilities and Energy Management Operations.  A panel of 
Commission employees, including Hatalowich, interviewed Wallett, but the 
Commissioners ultimately hired another interviewee, John Christensen, for the position. 
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 In October 2010, Wallett filed a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the 
Commission, Brimmeier, and Hatalowich had violated his First Amendment rights.  
Wallett also brought supplemental state law claims for Termination in Violation of Public 
Policy and Additional Consideration.  After dismissing the state law claims, the District 
Court granted Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment 
political patronage discrimination claim.  Wallett appealed. 
II.  Analysis
1
 
 In urging reversal of the District Court, Wallett argues that Defendants knew of his 
refusal to participate in their pay-to-play scheme and terminated him based on that 
knowledge.  Wallett further argues that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of 
Pennsylvania public policy. 
A.  Political Patronage Discrimination 
 According to Wallett, Defendants knew that he refused to participate in their pay-
to-play scheme and therefore demoted and later terminated him because of that failure to 
support them.  In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held that “promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political 
affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss and over its grant of a motion for 
summary judgment.  See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 
2013); Interstate Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Twp. of Mount Laurel, 706 F.3d 
527, 529 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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public employees.”  497 U.S. at 75.  This court has distilled the Supreme Court‟s political 
patronage doctrine into a three-part test that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a 
prima facie case of political patronage discrimination.   
A plaintiff seeking to prove a political patronage discrimination claim must show 
that (1) he “was employed at a public agency in a position that does not require political 
affiliation, (2) [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and (3) this 
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the government‟s employment 
decision.”  Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007).  
“Implicit in the third prong is a requirement that the plaintiff produce sufficient evidence 
to show the defendant knew of plaintiff‟s political persuasion.”  Goodman v. Pa. 
Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 2002).  This “requires proof of both 
knowledge and causation.” 2  Galli, 490 F.3d at 275. 
 The central disputed question in this appeal is whether Defendants knew that, by 
refusing to participate in their pay-to-play scheme, Wallett did not support their 
administration.
3
  See Galli, 290 F.3d at 275 (finding that the knowledge component is 
                                              
2
 We focus here on the knowledge component of the third prong of this court‟s political 
patronage discrimination test because that is the only prong that was briefed by the 
parties.  While not expressly conceding that Wallett has satisfied the first two prongs, 
Defendants make no meaningful argument to the contrary.  Therefore, we will assume 
without deciding that Wallett was employed at a public agency in a position that did not 
require a political affiliation and that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. 
3
 The District Court erred to the extent that it required Wallett to show that “Defendants 
were aware of [his] political views and these views contributed to his termination . . . .”  
Wallett v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, No. 10-2092, 2012 WL 3579575, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 
17, 2012).  This court has squarely held that “the right not to have allegiance to the 
official or party in power itself is protected under the First Amendment, irrespective of 
whether an employee is actively affiliated with an opposing candidate or power.”  Galli, 
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met where defendants know that plaintiff fails “to show public support for its officials 
and the political party in power”).  Wallett theorizes that, as a merit hire of a Republican 
administration, he was singled out for termination by the new Democratic administration 
because by not recommending Defendants‟ favored contractors he did not support their 
pay-to-play scheme.  Even when read in the light most favorable to Wallett, however, the 
evidence in the record does not support Wallett‟s assertion that Defendants were aware of 
his failure to support their alleged pay-to-play scheme. 
 Wallett presents a series of facts that he claims demonstrate Defendants‟ 
awareness of his lack of support for them.  First, after he was transferred from Director of 
Maintenance to Director of Facilities, Wallett recalls that the new Director of 
Maintenance told him that he should not “„take it personally‟” and that management “just 
wanted someone they could deal with especially on the personnel side.”  App. at 618. 
Second, Wallett refers to statements made by William Poole, a Facilities 
Department engineer under Wallett‟s immediate supervision.  Poole stated in his affidavit 
that Orbital, Inc., a frequent Commission contractor, “while meeting minimal 
qualifications (i.e., licensed engineers, etc.) was the least efficient and most expensive 
company and had multiple problems.”  App. at 666.  Poole was therefore “shocked” 
when Orbital was selected by the TRC for another contract even though the Facilities 
                                                                                                                                                  
490 F.3d at 272.  Notwithstanding the fact that the District Court took an overly narrow 
view of what is required for knowledge in a political patronage discrimination claim, we 
will nevertheless affirm the District Court‟s judgment because Wallett failed to satisfy 
that requirement even under this court‟s broader interpretation of knowledge in this 
context. 
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Department had apparently given Orbital low rankings in its summary and 
recommendation.  Id. 
Third, Frank Kempf, Wallett‟s supervisor in his position as Director of Facilities, 
testified during his deposition that he was directed by COO Hatalowich to lower 
Wallett‟s 2007 to 2008 performance evaluation from outstanding to commendable in two 
categories.  In his deposition, however, Kempf could not recall the specific reason 
Hatalowich had asked him to lower Wallett‟s performance rating. 
 Next, Wallett points to a 2008 incident in which Kempf was charged with 
reviewing 160 employees in the Engineering Department, including Wallett, and 
recommending that six be laid off.  When Kempf submitted the list, both CEO Brimmeier 
and Hatalowich asked Kempf why Wallett‟s name was not on it.  Kempf responded that 
he did not think Wallett should be laid off. 
 Finally, Wallett argues that his termination and the hiring of Christensen in the 
newly-created position show that Defendants had knowledge of his refusal to participate 
in their pay-to-play scheme and chose to replace him with someone more willing to 
cooperate with them.  Wallett supports this assertion by stating that Brimmeier himself 
“personally recruited” a politically-connected replacement who, despite the fact that he 
was unqualified for the position, was the only person whose name was ultimately 
forwarded to the Commissioners for their consideration.  Appellant‟s Br. at 36. 
 The inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented by Wallett, even 
when read in the light most favorable to him, do not sustain the conclusion that 
Defendants were aware of Wallett‟s supposed lack of support for them.  First, the alleged 
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statement by the new Director of Maintenance to Wallett explaining that Wallett was 
replaced because Defendants needed someone who would be more cooperative “on the 
personnel side” is ambiguous at best.  Second, the statements by Facilities engineer Poole 
regarding contracts awarded to Orbital are also ambiguous, especially in light of the fact 
that Wallett sometimes recommended Orbital for Commission jobs.   
 Next, Kempf stated that he was ordered to lower Wallett‟s evaluation rating in two 
categories from outstanding to commendable and was questioned about why Wallett was 
not on a list of six Facilities Department employees to be terminated.  These statements 
are most easily explained by Brimmeier and Hatalowich‟s apparent dislike for Wallett 
and rather than Wallett‟s refusal to participate in their schemes.  Kempf himself could not 
remember why Hatolowich
4
 ordered him to lower Wallett‟s evaluation ratings, even 
though Wallett attributed it to retaliation for his refusal to support Defendants. 
Finally, there is nothing in the record regarding the circumstances of Wallett‟s 
termination or Christensen‟s hiring that would bolster Wallett‟s assertion that Defendants 
                                              
4
 During his deposition, Hatalowich invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and declined to answer any substantive questions.  As Wallett notes in his 
brief, this court has held that a trial court judge “did not err in admitting as evidence the 
depositions of the non-party witnesses who exercised their Fifth Amendment privileges, 
nor in permitting the jury to draw adverse inferences therefrom.”  RAD Servs., Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 808 F.2d 271, 272 (3d Cir. 1986).  This precedent, however, 
stops far short of requiring the judge in a civil case to instruct the jury to draw an adverse 
inference from a non-party witness‟ invocation of the Fifth Amendment.  Moreover, even 
if we were to draw an adverse inference from Hatalowich‟s refusal to answer questions 
during his deposition, there would still not be sufficient evidence upon which to reverse 
the District Court‟s judgment. 
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had any knowledge whatsoever that he did not support them.
5
  It is true that Brimmeier 
spoke to Christensen based on a referral from the then Deputy Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of General Services and suggested that Christensen apply for 
the position.  However, the Commissioners made the final decision on whether to hire 
Christensen, not Brimmeier.  Moreover, Christensen was unquestionably qualified for the 
position. 
Although Wallett‟s political patronage discrimination claim relies on allegations 
that he experienced adverse employment actions because of his refusal to go along with 
the Defendants‟ pay-to-play scheme, Wallett references only one specific contractor – 
Orbital, Inc. – whose bids the Defendants allegedly tampered with over Wallett‟s 
objection.  Nevertheless, and as mentioned above, Wallett actually recommended Orbital 
for Commission contracts on various occasions.  Moreover, Wallett never complained or 
never object to any of the supposed “recommendations” for contractors that came from 
Defendants. 
Even when read in the light most favorable to him, Wallett is unable to point to 
anything in the record demonstrating that Defendants were aware that he refused to 
                                              
5
 In fact, there is very little evidence in this record indicating that Wallett engaged in any 
constitutionally protected conduct.  According to Wallett, his constitutionally protected 
conduct was his failure “to support [Defendants] political fundraising efforts” through 
their pay-to-play scheme.  Appellant‟s Br. at 29.  Yet, Wallett himself admits that he 
“was never told about these obviously politically fixed contracts . . . because of [his] 
straight arrow reputation for professionalism.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 15 n.16.  Thus, at its 
core, Wallett is arguing that he failed to support Defendants in schemes as to which he 
had little to no knowledge himself.  Defendants do not raise the issue of whether Wallett 
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct here, and we, therefore, do not rely on it in 
reaching our decision. 
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cooperate with their alleged pay-to-play scheme.  Thus, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s order granting summary judgment to Defendants on the political patronage 
discrimination count of the complaint. 
B.   Pennsylvania Public Policy 
 Wallett also argues that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Pennsylvania 
public policy because his termination was caused by Defendants‟ alleged pay-to-play and 
influence peddling schemes.  The general rule in Pennsylvania is that employment is at-
will unless there is a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary.  See Weaver v. 
Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 556 (Pa. 2009).  Pennsylvania courts have found an exception to 
at-will employment and permitted a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge 
only where the termination has “implicated a clear mandate of public policy.”  Id. at 564; 
see also id. at 569 (“[W]e can only declare the public policy of this Commonwealth 
where it is „so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there 
is virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.‟” (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 
409 (Pa. 1941))). 
 The District Court dismissed Wallett‟s public policy claim because it was reluctant 
to expand a very narrow exception to Pennsylvania‟s at-will employment doctrine in the 
absence of any Pennsylvania case law on point.  See Wallett v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 
No. 10-2092, 2011 WL 864405, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2011).  Wallett argues that the 
Defendants‟ pay-to-play scheme violated the Commonwealth Procurement Code, which 
provides for honesty and integrity by government officials in the hiring of outside 
contractors.  See 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2301, et seq. 
11 
 
We agree with the District Court that there is no clear mandate of public policy 
that has been violated here.  We are not aware of any Pennsylvania case law in which 
violation of the Commonwealth Procurement Code provided the basis for an exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine.  Additionally, even if there were a case on point, there is 
scant evidence in this record to support a finding that Defendants‟ conduct violated the 
Commonwealth Procurement Code.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
dismissal of Wallett‟s public policy claim. 
III.   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court. 
